Justice Scalia Got It Right, But for the Wrong Reasons: Scalia’s Recognition of the Supreme Court’s “Southern Exception” in U.S. Constitutional Jurisprudence and the Connection of “Southern Exceptionalism” to “American Exceptionalism by Wilets, James D.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 74 Number 1 Article 4 
11-22-2019 
Justice Scalia Got It Right, But for the Wrong Reasons: Scalia’s 
Recognition of the Supreme Court’s “Southern Exception” in U.S. 
Constitutional Jurisprudence and the Connection of “Southern 
Exceptionalism” to “American Exceptionalism" 
James D. Wilets 
Nova Southeastern University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
 Part of the Law and Society Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
James D. Wilets, Justice Scalia Got It Right, But for the Wrong Reasons: Scalia’s Recognition of the 
Supreme Court’s “Southern Exception” in U.S. Constitutional Jurisprudence and the Connection of 
“Southern Exceptionalism” to “American Exceptionalism", 74 U. Miami L. Rev. 109 (2019) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol74/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 




Justice Scalia Got It Right, 
But for the Wrong Reasons: 
Scalia’s Recognition of the Supreme 
Court’s “Southern Exception” in U.S. 
Constitutional Jurisprudence and the 
Connection of “Southern Exceptionalism” 
to “American Exceptionalism” 
JAMES D. WILETS* 
The late Justice Scalia has repeatedly and sardonically 
noted that the Supreme Court has discounted the views of 
                                                                                                             
 *  Professor of Law at Nova Southeastern University; M.A. in International 
Relations from Yale University in 1994; J.D. from Columbia Law School in 1987, 
and B.A. from the University of Washington in 1982. He teaches in the areas of 
International Law, Constitutional Law, Comparative Law, Human Rights, and 
European Union Law. While at Yale University, Professor Wilets prepared, at the 
request of the UN Secretary-General, the first two drafts of a proposal for reform-
ing the human rights functions of the United Nations, which was subsequently 
incorporated into the U.N.’s Agenda for Peace. He worked as an attorney for the 
International Human Rights Law Group’s Rule of Law Project in Romania and 
led a joint mission to Liberia by the National Democratic Institute and the Carter 
Center during the Liberian Civil War. Professor Wilets worked in Paris on some 
of the first negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians for a two-state solution. 
Professor Wilets writes extensively on constitutional and international law issues. 
I would like to thank Steven Saban and Samantha Schaum for their enormous 
assistance with this article. They were instrumental in editing and providing val-
uable insights into the issues this article raises. Steven J. Saban, J.D. Candidate, 
2020, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad College of Law; B.A. in 
Business Management, 2015, Florida Atlantic University. Samantha Schaum, J.D. 
Candidate, 2020, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad College of Law; 
B.A. in English, B.A. in Communications, 2014, Florida State University. 
I would also like to thank Matthew Glass for his considerable help. J.D., 
2018, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad College of Law; B.S. in Po-
litical Science and Social Science, 2010, Florida State University. 
 
110 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:109 
 
Southern states in determining whether there is a consensus 
among the states with regards to a Constitutional norm.  
This Article has termed that Supreme Court position as 
“Southern Exception” and can be viewed as an effort by 
some Justices to address the unique social, economic, reli-
gious and cultural traditions in the South engendered by its 
unique" and “exceptional” history. This Article will also ex-
plore how this "Southern Exception" affected American ju-
risprudence to the point of rendering it "exceptional" from 
much of the world's jurisprudence, essentially turning the 
traditional use of the term "American Exceptionalism" on its 
head. This Article will also explore the connection between 
the hostility of Justice Scalia and some other Justices to this 
“Southern Exception” and their hostility to the use of inter-
national and comparative law in general, particularly when 
used as a means to circumvent the traditional requirement 
of a “national consensus” to establish a constitutional norm. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The late Justice Scalia has noted that the Supreme Court has re-
peatedly discounted the position of former Confederate states in de-
termining whether there is a consensus in the country for the adop-
tion of a particular constitutional norm.  This disregard of the normal 
manner by which the Supreme Court determines whether a consen-
sus exists is termed within this Article the “Southern Exception.”1 
Scalia has argued that some Justices give the laws of the states of 
the former Confederacy less weight than the laws of other states 
when the Supreme Court is called upon to determine whether there 
is a national consensus on a given constitutional issue.2 The South-
ern Exception in Supreme Court jurisprudence, as sardonically iden-
tified by Justice Scalia, can be viewed as an effort by some Justices 
to address the unique social, economic, religious, and cultural tradi-
tions in the South engendered by its “exceptional” history of racial 
discrimination. 
Although this Article specifically focuses on Southern Excep-
tionalism, this Article will also argue that Southern Exceptionalism 
has contributed substantially to making the United States, as a 
whole, exceptional from its international peers. This “American Ex-
ceptionalism”3 is a natural result of Southern Exceptionalism. As 
such, the American Exceptionalism discussed in this Article is es-
sentially the opposite of the more common use of American Excep-
tionalism as a description of a morally superior United States.4 It is 
a premise of the Article that for many of the same reasons, Southern 
Exceptionalism has rendered the South anomalous as compared to 
the rest of the country. As a major part of the United States, it has 
also rendered the United States as a whole out of sync with much of 
the democratic world in its approach to a wide variety of issues. 
This Article will further discuss how this Southern Exceptional-
ism went well beyond legal issues explicitly dealing with race and 
                                                                                                             
 1 See, e.g., James M. McPherson, Antebellum Southern Exceptionalism: A 
New Look at an Old Question, 50 CIV. WAR HIST. 418, 418–19 (2004). 
 2 See infra Section III.A. 
 3 For a more thorough discussion on the various attempts to define “Ameri-
can Exceptionalism,” see Ian Tyrrell, American Exceptionalism, From Stalin with 
Love, AEON (Oct. 10, 2016), https://aeon.co/ideas/american-exceptionalism-from-
stalin-with-love. 
 4 See id. 
112 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:109 
 
covered a broad panoply of issues ranging from juvenile executions 
to gender equality and LGBTQ+ rights. For example, in United 
States v. Windsor,5 Justice Scalia noted in his dissent that “the object 
of this condemnation is not the legislature of some once-Confeder-
ate Southern state (familiar objects of the Court’s scorn, see, e.g., 
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987)), but our respected co-
ordinate branches, the Congress and Presidency of the United 
States.”6 This Article will also explore the connection between the 
hostility of Justice Scalia and other Justices to this Southern Excep-
tion and their hostility to the use of international and comparative 
law, particularly when used as a means to circumvent the traditional 
requirement of a national consensus to establish a constitutional 
norm.7 This hostility seems all the more remarkable when Justice 
Scalia claimed to be a proponent of original intent,8 yet the Consti-
tution and early American jurisprudence were much less hostile to 
international law than is the present Court.  Indeed, originalists have 
been the jurists who have departed the farthest from the original con-
stitutional view of international law.9 
In determining whether a particular norm should be elevated to 
constitutional status, the Court has often, although not always, relied 
upon the existence of a consensus among the states.10 It is when the 
Supreme Court has deviated from this consensus-based approach 
                                                                                                             
 5 570 U.S. 744 (2012). 
 6 Id. at 795 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 7 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (“We must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States of Amer-
ica that we are expounding. . . . [W]here there is not first a settled consensus 
among our own people, the views of other nations, however enlightened the Jus-
tices of this Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans 
through the Constitution.”). 
 8 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1175, 1184 (1989) (“Just as that manner of textual exegesis facilitates the 
formulation of general rules, so does, in the constitutional field, adherence to a 
more or less originalist theory of construction.”). 
 9 Compare U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“and all treaties made, or which shall 
be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the 
land”) and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 539 (1832) (citing the Supremacy 
Clause to strike down a Georgia law because it conflicted with a treaty between 
the United States and the sovereign Cherokee Nation), with Thompson, 487 U.S. 
at 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 10 See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407–12 (1857). 
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that the Southern Exception has become most evident.11 Justice 
Scalia alluded to this Southern Exception to condemn the Court’s 
apparent devaluation of the Southern states in evaluating whether 
there is a consensus. Scalia’s frustration was particularly evident in 
not only United States v. Windsor,12 a landmark gay marriage case, 
but also in cases such as Thompson v. Oklahoma13 and Stanford v. 
Kentucky,14 both of which addressed the juvenile death penalty. In 
the death penalty cases, Justice Scalia decried the alleged substitu-
tion of consensus within the United States with foreign and interna-
tional consensus and the simultaneous discounting of broad South-
ern support for the juvenile death penalty.15 
This Article argues that Justice Scalia was factually correct as to 
the existence of a Southern Exception, but that he conveniently over-
looked the roots of why such an exception exists. Scalia implied that 
it is borne of an irrational anti-Southern bias, whereas the reality is 
far more complex—there are historical and judicial reasons as to 
why the Court would apply this exception. The Confederate Excep-
tion is arguably a recognition that the 200 years of slavery and al-
most 100 years of apartheid in many parts of the United States did 
indeed render this country’s legal jurisprudence exceptional.16 
Moreover, to the extent the South was exceptional, its weight in the 
body politic and Supreme Court rendered U.S. jurisprudence itself 
exceptional with respect to the rest of the world. For example, large 
parts of the United States practiced segregation at a time when apart-
heid was widely condemned in international law and by the great 
                                                                                                             
 11 Obvious examples of this deviation are Brown v. Board of Education, 347 
U.S. 483, 489–93 (1954), or Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9–11 (1967), both 
decided at times when there was no clear national consensus on the respective 
issues of segregation and miscegenation laws. 
 12 See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 795 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). 
 13 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 859 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). 
 14 See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370–73 (1989) (Scalia, J.), abro-
gated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005). 
 15 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Stanford, 492 U.S. 
at 369 n.1 (“We emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency that are 
dispositive, rejecting the contention . . . that the sentencing practices of other 
countries are relevant.”). 
 16 See infra Section I.A. 
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majority of the world’s countries.17 With the Court’s frequent efforts 
to adopt anti-civil rights positions,18 the issue of why Justice Scalia 
and other conservative Justices were so protective of states’ rights 
yet simultaneously hostile to international definitions of human 
rights norms and the expansion of civil rights on the domestic level 
is a much larger topic and would require speculating as to the mental 
state of those Justices. However, one can argue that those Justices’ 
resentment of the Southern Exception and their hostility to interna-
tional and comparative law are not mere happenstance.19 
The divergence of values between the former Confederate states, 
Northern states, and other democracies becomes particularly evident 
in the interpretation of constitutional norms.20 Presumably, the 
Court consciously—or subconsciously—acknowledged this excep-
tional history when evaluating which norms are emblematic of the 
practices of “civilized” nations.21 As noted above, the Court has 
done so by its tendency to accord less value to the legal norms of 
Southern states when those states’ norms conflict with a majority of 
the United States and the vast majority of the “civilized” world. 
Southern Exceptionalism is all the more pronounced in the in-
terpretation of constitutional provisions. The Constitution, provid-
ing the political structure of the country, enshrined the compromise 
between the Northern and Southern states over slavery at the coun-
try’s inception.22 Thus, much of the Constitution and its interpreta-
tion has been intertwined with the institution of slavery and the later 
                                                                                                             
 17 Lennox S. Hinds, The Gross Violations of Human Rights of the Apartheid 
Regime Under International Law, 1 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 231, 310–11 
(1999). 
 18 See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404–07 (1857). 
 19 See infra Part III. 
 20 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191–92 (1986) (citing Palko v. 
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324–26 (1939)); see also Moreover: The Cruel and 
Ever More Unusual Punishment, ECONOMIST (May 13, 1999) https://www.econ-
omist.com/moreover/1999/05/13/the-cruel-and-ever-more-unusual-punishment 
(Eng.) (discussing the United States’ deviation from the international consensus 
of large democracies on the death penalty). 
 21 See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830–31 (1988). 
 22 A few provisions within the Constitution are relevant, such as the “three-
fifths compromise,” found in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. This provision guaran-
tees each state a number of representatives, determined by the state’s population 
size. Id. However, “other persons,” or slaves, within that population were counted 
as three-fifths of a whole person. Id. Southerners desired that the population count 
2019] JUSTICE SCALIA GOT IT RIGHT, BUT FOR THE WRONG REASONS 115 
 
systematic oppression of people of African descent.23  Further, con-
stitutional provisions—particularly the Bill of Rights—often con-
tain broad and vague language and thus tend to be a particularly pro-
nounced flash point for differences over whether there is a consen-
sus among the states regarding constitutional rights.24 For example, 
what kind of conduct constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment” 
and what are the norms of “civilized” nations in the context of the 
Eighth Amendment?25 Some Justices felt it necessary to employ in-
ternational and comparative norms specifically because many states, 
                                                                                                             
include slaves as whole persons—in turn bolstering the number of Southern-state 
representatives. See Theodore R. Johnson, We Used to Count Black Americans as 
3/5 of a Person. For Reparations, Give Them 5/3 of a Vote., WASH. POST.: 
POSTEVERYTHING (Aug. 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/postevery-
thing/wp/2015/08/21/we-used-to-count-black-americans-as-35-of-a-person-in-
stead-of-reparations-give-them-53-of-a-vote/. Another provision found in Article 
I contains an express limitation on Congress’ ability to prohibit the importation of 
slaves prior to 1808. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. Finally, as an effort to resolve the 
extradition plight faced by slave states at the time, the drafters included the Fugi-
tive Slaves Clause, requiring states to return escaped slaves, or “Person[s] held to 
Service or Labour,” to the state from which the slave escaped. U.S. CONST. art. 
IV, § 2, cl. 3. Without the inclusion of these provisions condoning slavery, many 
in the Northern states feared the South would elect to create a nation of their own, 
thereby dividing the nation into two. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 507 
(1857) (suggesting that the clauses relating to slavery likely “embody some com-
promise among the statesmen of that time”). 
 23 See, e.g., Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 450–52 (finding an act of Congress that 
restricted the institution of slavery was “not warranted by the Constitution” and 
therefore void). The Dred Scott decision is notable because the Court went 
through extraordinary lengths to twist factual reality to justify the institution of 
slavery. For example, Justice Taney claimed that, at the time of the Constitution’s 
inception, the opinion of the “civilized portion of the white race” was “fixed and 
universal” that people of African descent were an “inferior class of beings, who 
had been subjugated by the dominant race” and who “had no rights or privi-
leges . . . .” Id. at 404–07. However, reality shows, and Justice Taney later 
acknowledged, that his argument was ill-considered, as nations around the globe 
began to prohibit or limit the institution of slavery. See Sarah H. Cleveland, For-
eign Authority, American Exceptionalism, and the Dred Scott Case, 82 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 393, 423–24 (2007) (discussing the utter lack of support behind Taney’s 
assertion of a universally held view that blacks “were not part of the polity of any 
civilized state at the time of the Founding”). 
 24 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99–01 (1958). 
 25 See id. at 99–104 (1958) (holding that the Eighth Amendment did not allow 
Congress to revoke petitioner’s citizenship as consequence for crime). 
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primarily former slave states, were so exceptional in the manner in 
which they interpreted these constitutional norms.26 
For a concrete illustration of how this Confederate Exception af-
fects American jurisprudence, one has only to look at some of the 
more recent opinions by Justice Kennedy. Although Justice Ken-
nedy was a relatively conservative Justice, he nevertheless earned 
the ire of fellow conservatives by arguing that laws such as the ju-
venile death penalty27 or laws against same-gender sexual activity28 
were unconstitutional because the United States was the only indus-
trialized nation to have them. In the case of juvenile death penalties, 
the United States was for the most part alone among the world’s 
nations.29 Justice Scalia, in numerous bitter ripostes, argued that for-
eign and comparative law had no place in determining whether a 
consensus existed in America with regard to interpretation of a par-
ticular constitutional norm.30 However, Justice Scalia qualified this 
argument by stating that international law may be useful in deter-
mining whether such a previously existing consensus was a coinci-
dence or something more fundamental to all “civilized” societies 
and thus deserving of constitutional protection.31 
                                                                                                             
 26 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005). 
 27 Id.; see also Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court, 5-4, Forbids Execution in 
Juvenile Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2005), https://www.ny-
times.com/2005/03/02/politics/supreme-court-54-forbids-execution-in-juvenile-
crime.html. 
 28 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (relying on a decision from 
the European Court of Human Rights in reasoning that outlawing homosexuality 
is unconstitutional); see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 6-3, Legalize Gay Sex-
ual Conduct in Sweeping Reversal of Court’s ‘86 Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 
2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/27/us/supreme-court-homosexual-
rights-justices-6-3-legalize-gay-sexual-conduct.html. 
 29 Roper, 543 U.S. at 577 (2005) (“[I]t is fair to say that the United States 
now stands alone in a world that has turned its face against the juvenile death 
penalty.”). However, the United States was not truly alone, as juvenile executions 
have continued post-Roper in some countries, particularly Iran, but also Yemen, 
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Pakistan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. See 
AMNESTY INT’L, EXECUTION OF JUVENILES SINCE 1990 AS OF DECEMBER 2018, at 
1 (2018), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/act5095112018eng-
lish.pdf. 
 30 See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989) (Scalia, J.). 
 31 See id. In Stanford, Scalia quoted his own dissenting opinion in Thompson 
v. Oklahoma: “The practices of other nations, particularly other democracies, can 
be relevant to determining whether a practice uniform among our people is not 
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Likely in response to Justice Scalia’s arguments, Justice Ken-
nedy changed tactics, arguing in Roper v. Simmons,32 for example, 
that international and comparative norms were helpful but not dis-
positive in determining the meaning of such norms. Justice Scalia, 
utterly unconvinced, continued to deride such an approach, contend-
ing that Kennedy’s argument was a run-around Southern states by 
implying a Southern Exception.33 
I. THE EMPIRICAL BASIS FOR APPLYING THE “SOUTHERN 
EXCEPTION” IN U.S. JURISPRUDENCE 
A. The Unique Racial Construct of Slavery and  
Apartheid in the United States 
The history of American slavery and apartheid illustrates just 
how legally and normatively exceptional the Confederate states 
were from the rest of America and the world, including those coun-
tries from which the United States has received its legal traditions. 
In 2006, the Trustees of Brown University published a report 
examining the Brown family’s role in the slave trade (the “Brown 
Report”).34 The Brown Report provides, inter alia, a thorough ex-
amination of the racialized nature of American slavery,35 which was 
noted to be exceptional even in comparison to other countries that 
                                                                                                             
merely a historical accident, but rather so ‘implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty’ that it occupies a place not merely in our mores but, text permitting, in our 
Constitution as well.” Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868 n.4 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) 
(Cardozo, J.)). Scalia’s analysis overlooks, for example, the glaring reality that 
there was no consensus in the United States regarding mixed-race marriages at 
the time Loving v. Virginia was handed down in 1967—indeed, an overwhelming 
majority of white Americans disapproved of interracial marriages in 1968. See 
Joseph Carroll, Most Americans Approve of Interracial Marriages, GALLUP (Aug. 
16, 2007), http://www.gallup.com/poll/28417/Most-Americans-Approve-Interra-
cial-Marriages.aspx (noting that seventy-five percent of white respondents disap-
proved of interracial marriages in 1968, while just seventeen percent approved). 
 32 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. 
 33 See id. at 609, 628. 
 34 BROWN U. STEERING COMM. ON SLAVERY & JUST., SLAVERY AND JUSTICE 
15–17 (2006), http://brown.edu/Research/Slavery_Justice/documents/Slav-
eryAndJustice.pdf [hereinafter Brown Report]. 
 35 Id. at 8. 
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had slavery.36 The Brown Report went so far as to argue that the 
United States’ system of slavery was historically unique in its ra-
cialized nature.37 As noted by the Brown Report: 
Few if any societies in history carried this logic fur-
ther than the United States, where people of African 
descent came to be regarded as a distinct “race” of 
persons, fashioned by nature for hard labor. 
. . . . 
If American slavery has any claims to being histori-
cally “peculiar,” its peculiarity lay in its rigorous ra-
cialism, the systematic way in which racial ideas 
were used to demean and deny the humanity of peo-
ple of even partial African descent. This historical 
legacy would make the process of incorporating the 
formerly enslaved as citizens far more problematic in 
the United States than in other New World slave so-
cieties.38 
The racialized nature of American slavery could help explain 
why the United States was also historically unique in its racial atti-
tudes after slavery. For example, Brazil’s history of slavery lasted 
even longer than that of the United States, yet Brazil did not legally 
and systematically institutionalize racism after slavery to the extent 
that the United States did.39 It is important to note that the Brown 
Report does not indicate that American slavery was distinctive in its 
cruelty.40 For instance, slavery in other civilizations was sometimes 
based on religion, such as the traditional Christian justifications for 
                                                                                                             
 36 Id. 
 37 See generally id. (detailing the history of racialized slavery in the United 
States). 
 38 Id. 
 39 See HERBERT S. KLEIN, AFRICAN SLAVERY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
CARIBBEAN 217–18, 223–24 (1st ed. 1986). 
 40 Brown Report, supra note 34, at 7–8. 
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slavery41 or the dictate in the Torah that Hebrews should not enslave 
other Hebrews.42 Slavery was also a common result of conquest, 
punishment, or other non-explicitly racial criteria.43 In the United 
States, however, these traditional justifications were ultimately su-
perseded by a justification based on the alleged inferiority of the 
African “race.”44 Thus, while numerous other civilizations did have 
slavery, the United States took the radical approach of basing slav-
ery entirely on race, relegating people of African descent to a kind 
of subhuman status.45 This view was explicitly endorsed by the Su-
preme Court in Dred Scott,46 and continued to influence American 
                                                                                                             
 41 See Noel Rae, How Christian Slaveholders Used the Bible to Justify Slav-
ery, TIME (Feb. 23, 2018), http://time.com/5171819/christianity-slavery-book-ex-
cerpt/ (highlighting slaveholders’—most of whom identified as Christian—two 
favorite texts from the Bible). 
 42 James A. Diamond, The Treatment of Non-Israelite Slaves: From Moses 
to Moses, THETORAH.COM (Apr. 19, 2016), https://thetorah.com/the-treatment-
of-non-israelite-slaves-from-moses-to-moses/ (stating that, initially, the differ-
ences between Hebrew slaves and non-Hebrew slaves were that the latter were 
“permanent acquisitions and never had to be freed.”). 
 43 See KLEIN, supra note 39, at 1–4. 
 44 See Brown Report, supra note 34, at 8. The Brown Report notes that, sim-
ilar to much of the rest of the world, the American colonists initially relied on 
religion and culture as justifications for slavery. Id. These rationalizations were 
later replaced by an “explicit theory of race” by the time of the American Revo-
lution. Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404–05 (1857) (“they [persons of 
African descent] were at that time [of the founding] considered as a subordinate 
and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race”). 
Much of the Court’s reasoning in Dred Scott was based on what it considered as 
the view of society during the Framer’s time—that society had relegated the ex-
istence of African slaves to that of being bought and sold, treated as mere chattel, 
and used for profit. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407. The Court also references two 
clauses in the Constitution “which point directly and specifically to the negro race 
as a separate class of persons,” and specifically argues, in reference to the impor-
tation sanctions of 1808, that these sanctions were “unquestionably of persons of 
the race of [African descent], as the traffic in slaves in the United States had al-
ways been confined to [persons of African descent].” Id. at 411. 
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jurisprudence throughout the rest of the Nineteenth Century and be-
yond.47 For instance, in the 1967 case Loving v. Virginia, the Su-
preme Court quoted the following portion of the 1959 trial court’s 
opinion: 
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, 
malay and red, and he placed them on separate con-
tinents. And but for the interference with his arrange-
ment there would be no cause for such marriages. 
The fact that he separated the races shows that he did 
not intend for the races to mix.48 
The Brown Report summarizes empirical data demonstrating 
that the former slave states were indeed exceptional in their attitudes 
towards African Americans.49 States continued to legally oppress 
individuals of African descent well after slavery’s formal demise 
through apartheid and other laws designed to separate, exploit, and 
otherwise oppress African Americans.50 American apartheid ex-
tended to basic functions of society, such as swimming pools, librar-
ies, and transportation;51 as well as to public schools,52 marriage,53 
politics, and numerous other areas of societal activity.54 It even 
criminalized non-public activities such as mixed-race playing of 
                                                                                                             
 47 See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (upholding—nearly 
forty years after Dred Scott v. Sandford—the notion that those of African descent 
are inferior). 
 48 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967). 
 49 See Brown Report, supra note 34 at 67–68. 
 50 See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 543 (1896) (announcing the separate but equal doc-
trine, the Court states that “[a] statute which implies merely a legal distinction 
between the white and colored races . . . has no tendency to destroy the legal 
equality of the two races, or reestablish a state of involuntary servitude.”). 
 51 See Segregation in Public Places, AM. PUB. MEDIA, http://americanradio-
works.publicradio.org/features/remembering/public.html (last visited Apr. 3, 
2019). 
 52 See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544–45. 
 53 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (striking down Virginia’s miscegenation stat-
utes). 
 54 Gabriel J. Chin & Randy Wagner, The Tyranny of the Minority: Jim Crow 
and the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65, 92 
(2008). 
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checkers or dominoes.55 From the post-Civil War period until the 
early 1960s, systematic governmental discrimination permeated 
many American states—particularly the Southern states, which had 
practiced slavery—and relegated the United States to the unenviable 
status of being one of only a handful of countries with systematic 
segregation or apartheid.56 
B. The Extension of This Unique Construction  
of Race to Religion 
It is difficult to understand the unique American manner of legal 
subjugation of African Americans without understanding the mutu-
ally reinforcing impacts of slavery and religion. The North Ameri-
can racialization of slavery is evidenced in the racist interpretations 
of Christianity that took root on American soil.57 This discussion is 
essential because of the historically close connection between reli-
gion and law.58 Religion provides a theological justification for the 
existing societal order, as is reflected in society’s laws.59 
                                                                                                             
 55 David Pilgrim, What Was Jim Crow, FERRIS ST. UNIV. JIM CROW MUSEUM 
OF RACIST MEMORABILIA, http://www.ferris.edu/jimcrow/what.htm (last visited 
Oct. 13, 2019). 
 56 See Hinds, supra note 17 (detailing the United States’ troubled history with 
racism and apartheid politics). From 1948–1994, South Africa maintained a sys-
tem of apartheid that was analogous to that of the United States. Id. at 258, 316–
17. Apartheid in South Africa was “a state system which organized the machinery 
of law, government and law enforcement to force the whole population into an 
exploitative economy, which excluded eighty percent of the population from con-
trol of the land and its resources, and maintained this control, without democratic 
participation and consent.” Id. at 249. See also Rupert Cornwell, Ian Smith: Rho-
desian Prime Minister Who Attempted to Prevent Black Rule by Declaring Inde-
pendence from Britain, INDEP. (Nov. 22, 2007, 1:00 AM), http://www.independ-
ent.co.uk/news/obituaries/ian-smith-rhodesian-prime-minister-who-attempted-
to-prevent-black-rule-by-declaring-independence-758993.html (detailing South-
ern Rhodesia’s (today called Zimbabwe) prime minister’s efforts to prevent 
“black rule” in the mid-twentieth century). 
 57 See Rae, supra note 41. 
 58 See Aernout J. Nieuwenhuis, State and Religion, a Multidimensional Re-
lationship: Some Comparative Law Remarks, 10 INT’L J. OF CONST. L. 153, 153 
(2012). 
 59 See Rae, supra note 41. The Virginia Supreme Court has often connected 
religion and slavery, as demonstrated in its rationale for upholding miscegenation 
statutes that punished interracial marriages: 
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Indeed, the major Christian denominations in the United States 
split along each region’s respective approach to slavery and apart-
heid.60 As a general observation, those areas of the United States 
that practiced slavery and institutionalized apartheid are, for the 
most part, the same areas of the United States where Christian de-
nominations that historically justified slavery and apartheid are pre-
dominant.61 As Professor William Eskridge has observed, religion 
frequently conflates status, belief, and conduct.62 Put another way, 
it can be argued that religion functions as a normative justification 
for pre-existing societal and economic conditions.63 In the case of 
American slavery and apartheid, the need for religious justifications 
was all the more pressing because of the controversial nature of 
those institutions. 
One example of this phenomenon can be witnessed in the his-
torical position of the Southern Baptist Convention (the “SBC”),64 
which has traditionally been the largest Protestant denomination in 
the United States and traditionally dominant in the Southern states 
that practiced slavery and apartheid.65 The SBC was created when 
the Baptists split into Northern and Southern Baptists, specifically 
                                                                                                             
The right to regulate the institution of marriage; to classify the 
parties and persons who may lawfully marry; to dissolve the 
relation by divorce; and to impose such restraints upon the re-
lation as the laws of God, and the laws of propriety, morality 
and social order demand, has been exercised by all civilized 
governments in all ages of the world. 
Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 752 (Va. 1955) (emphasis added) (quoting Kinney 
v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 858, 862 (Va. 1878)). 
 60 See infra notes 64–69; Brown Report, supra note 34, at 8. 
 61 James D. Wilets, From Divergence to Convergence? A Comparative and 
International Law Analysis of LGBTI Rights in the Context of Race and Post-
Colonialism, 21 DUKE J. OF COMP. & INT’L L. 631, 634 (2011). 
 62 William N. Eskridge Jr., Noah’s Curse: How Religion Often Conflates Sta-
tus, Belief, and Conduct to Resist Antidiscrimination Norms, 45 GA. L. REV. 657, 
666–68 (2011). 
 63 See id. 
 64 See Adeel Hassan, Oldest Institution of Southern Baptist Convention Re-
veals Past Ties to Slavery, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/12/12/us/southern-baptist-slavery.html?searchResultPosition=1. 
 65 Wilets, supra note 61 at 656. 
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because of slavery, and the split continued due to the Southern Bap-
tists’ support of apartheid.66 The Northern Baptists, who, as a whole, 
were anti-slavery and anti-segregation, formed the American Bap-
tist Churches, USA.67 The SBC itself issued an apology in 1995 on 
its involvement with slavery and racism on the 150th Anniversary 
of the SBC in Atlanta, Georgia.68 In its apology, the SBC stated: 
WHEREAS, Our relationship to African-Americans 
has been hindered from the beginning by the role that 
slavery played in the formation of the Southern Bap-
tist Convention; and 
WHEREAS, Many of our Southern Baptist forbears 
defended the right to own slaves, and either partici-
pated in, supported, or acquiesced in the particularly 
inhumane nature of American slavery; and 
WHEREAS, In later years Southern Baptists failed, 
in many cases, to support, and in some cases op-
posed, legitimate initiatives to secure the civil rights 
of African-Americans; and 
WHEREAS, Racism has led to discrimination, op-
pression, injustice, and violence, both in the Civil 
War and throughout the history of our nation; and 
WHEREAS, Racism has divided the body of Christ 
and Southern Baptists in particular, and separated us 
from our African-American brothers and sisters; and 
WHEREAS, Many of our congregations have inten-
tionally and/or unintentionally excluded African-
                                                                                                             
 66 Hassan, supra note 64 (“The denomination began in 1845 when it split 
from Baptists in the North over slavery.”). 
 67 See What We Believe: Our History, AM. BAPTIST CHURCHES USA, 
https://www.abc-usa.org/what-we-believe/our-history/ (last visited Aug. 15, 
2019). 
 68 Resolution on Racial Reconciliation on the 150th Anniversary of the South-
ern Baptist Convention, S. BAPTIST CONVENTION (1995), http://www.sbc.net/res-
olutions/899/resolution-on-racial-reconciliation-on-the-150th-anniversary-of-
the-southern-baptist-convention (admitting to and apologizing for the Southern 
Baptist Convention’s intimate ties to American slavery). 
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Americans from worship, membership, and leader-
ship; and 
WHEREAS, Racism profoundly distorts our under-
standing of Christian morality, leading some South-
ern Baptists to believe that racial prejudice and dis-
crimination are compatible with the Gospel . . . .69 
The development of particular denominations on U.S. soil to ra-
tionalize slavery begs the question of why many other countries, 
which also had slavery, did not develop specific religions or reli-
gious tenets to justify their racist and social institutions.70 It can be 
argued, as a historical matter, that many of the settlers to the United 
States viewed themselves as morally exceptional from the European 
societies from which they emigrated.71 
While this sense of American Exceptionalism may permeate the 
American psyche, it does not fully explain the difference between 
the generally prevalent phenomenon of American Exceptionalism 
and the development of a particularly exceptional Southern ap-
proach to law, religion, and social norms.72 Participants in slavery 
in the South had a particular onus to demonstrate that they too were 
morally exceptional and had to reconcile their enslavement of hu-
man beings with their professed religiosity and putative moral ex-
ceptionalism.73 If one thinks of religion as “the law” and slavery as 
“the facts” of one’s behavior, then a way to conform one’s behavior 
to “the law” is to change the characterization of “the facts.” As Carl 
Sandburg famously stated: “If the law is against you, talk about the 
evidence. If the evidence is against you, talk about the law, and, 
                                                                                                             
 69 Id. 
 70 See generally, e.g., HERBERT KLEIN, SLAVERY IN THE AMERICAS: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF VIRGINIA AND CUBA 105–126 (1988) (comparing the 
instrumental role that Catholicism had in shaping Cuban slavery with instrumental 
role that slavery had in shaping Virginian Anglicanism). 
 71 See id. at 122 (“Unlike the clergy of Cuba, the clergy of Virginia was una-
ble to convince the planters that emancipation was a good act in the sight of God 
and was to be considered a common and accepted form of pious action.”); see 
also Joshua Zeitz, How Trump is Making Us Rethink American Exceptionalism, 
POLITICO (Jan. 7, 2018), https://www.politico.com/maga-
zine/story/2018/01/07/trump-american-exceptionalism-history-216253. 
 72 See McPherson, supra note 1, at 431–33. 
 73 Id. 
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since you ask me, if the law and the evidence are both against you, 
then pound on the table and yell like hell.”74 The Supreme Court 
demonstrated this very phenomenon when it stated in Dred Scott v. 
Sandford that even free individuals of African descent could not be 
United States citizens, even if citizens of a state, because they were 
not in fact “people” within the meaning of the Constitution, nor did 
any single person in the civilized world regard them as such.75 Jus-
tice Taney’s language is stunning in the factual assumptions he 
made to reconcile his version of the law with the facts before him: 
They had for more than a century before been re-
garded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether 
unfit to associate with the white race, either in social 
or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had 
no rights which the white man was bound to respect; 
and that the negro might justly and lawfully be re-
duced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and 
sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchan-
dise and traffic, whenever a profit could be made by 
it. This opinion was at that time fixed and universal 
in the civilized portion of the white race. It was re-
garded as an axiom in morals as well as in politics, 
which no one thought of disputing, or supposed to be 
open to dispute; and men in every grade and position 
in society daily and habitually acted upon it in their 
private pursuits, as well as in matters of public con-
cern, without doubting for a moment the correctness 
of this opinion.76 
What stands out in Justice Taney’s opinion is his factual state-
ment that the opinion—white supremacy—“was at that time fixed 
and universal” for the Founders.77 However, many educated people 
at the time of Dred Scott likely understood that people doubted the 
correctness of slavery even at the time the Constitution was written. 
                                                                                                             
 74 CARL SANDBURG, THE PEOPLE, YES 69 (1936). 
 75 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404–05 (1857). 
 76 Id. at 407 (emphasis added). 
 77 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Slavery was a divisive issue at the time of the Constitutional Con-
vention.78 It was such a contested concept that one of the few places 
the Constitution actually regulates the behavior of individuals is 
with respect to slavery, effectively forcing the federal government 
to enforce the institution,79 even as the federal government was for-
bidden to interfere with any other kind of state violation of human 
rights.80 
It should not be surprising that the Southern-based religions 
were able to change the very tenets of the religion to justify slavery, 
given that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court could characterize 
slavery in a manner that he knew was incorrect and that many people 
throughout the country felt was incorrect.81 Moreover, the Chief 
Justice likely knew that educated people understood that what he 
was saying was false.82 What begs further exploration is why other 
contemporaneous slave societies felt no such need to conform their 
religions to their realities, even though the legal definitions of colo-
nial empires such as Spain and Portugal and the Netherlands inher-
ited their definitions of slavery through the Catholic Church.83 
Indeed, at first the American colonies had no specific legal the-
ory regarding slavery.84 As documented by historian Edmund Mor-
gan, the first Africans brought to the United States were indentured 
servants, not slaves, who intermarried with other white indentured 
                                                                                                             
 78 See Paul Finkelman, The Founders and Slavery: Little Ventured, Little 
Gained, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 413, 426 (2001) (“Delegates from Connecticut 
and Massachusetts were especially afraid that if slavery were explicitly mentioned 
in the Constitution it would not be ratified in the North.”) 
 79 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1; id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. 
 80 Not until the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 did the fed-
eral government gain this authority. See id. amend. XIV. 
 81 See Sarah Goldberg, et al., Dickinson and Slavery, DICKINSON: HOUSE 
DIVIDED PROJECT, http://housedivided.dickinson.edu/sites/slavery/people/roger-
taney/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2019) (noting that Taney emancipated his own slaves 
prior to the Dred Scott decision, and his pro-slavery verdict was publicly 
disapproved of as the decision led to the election of Abraham Lincoln for 
president). 
 82 See id. 
 83 Brown Report, supra note 34, at 8. 
 84 Id. at 8. 
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servants.85 Morgan describes the transformation of free African in-
dentured servants into slaves, largely to prevent the ever-growing 
free indentured servant population from overwhelming the planta-
tion owners.86 In effect, the transformation of Africans from inden-
tured servants into slaves was a necessary prerequisite for the ulti-
mate establishment of a successful republic, at least for the white 
population.87 Thus, with the transformation of indentured servitude 
to slavery for Africans,88 the American colonies, and later the 
United States, developed their own legal foundations for slavery. 
Consistent with Morgan’s documentation, the Brown Report ob-
served that “the laws they fashioned, beginning in Virginia in the 
1620s and continuing through the Civil War, were historically un-
precedented in their complete denial of the legal personality of the 
enslaved. Slaves in North America were chattel, no different in law 
from horses, handlooms, or other pieces of disposable property.”89 
This unique American moralistic view of slavery, buttressed by a 
deep racially influenced “religiosity,” arguably helped the creation 
of the American system of apartheid even after the end of slavery.90 
This also helps explain why race has continued to play a dominant 
role in political and cultural discourse in the United States long after 
the abolishment of slavery and even after the termination of apart-
heid. 
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOUTHERN EXCEPTIONALISM 
AND AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 
A. The Southern Stranglehold over the National Body Politic 
and Its Cultural Influence in the North 
Although this Article specifically focuses on Southern Excep-
tionalism, it is important to note that racial discrimination against 
                                                                                                             
 85 EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY-AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE 
ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 154–57 (1976). 
 86 Id. at 385–86; Indentured Servants in the U.S., SOUTH FLORIDA PBS, 
http://www.pbs.org/opb/historydetectives/feature/indentured-servants-in-the-us/ 
(last visited Aug. 15, 2019). 
 87 MORGAN, supra note 85, at 386. 
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 89 Brown Report, supra note 34 at 8. 
 90 See KLEIN, supra note 70, at 122. 
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non-European ethnic groups was not limited to the South.91 While 
this phenomenon would seem to undercut the premise of this Arti-
cle, it instead demonstrates the close connection between Southern 
Exceptionalism and American Exceptionalism. 
Northern political parties themselves frequently promulgated 
discriminatory laws.92 Additionally, after the Civil War, the South 
was able to increase its political power as black individuals in the 
South counted as a full person for purposes of electoral apportion-
ment, rather than three-fifths of a person, as slaves, under the origi-
nal Constitution.93 As blacks were gradually denied the franchise in 
the South, white representation in the Southern states in Congress 
dramatically expanded.94 Southern states were granted credit in 
Congress and the Electoral College for their entire populations while 
those same states denied the franchise to their black citizens.95 
In addition to the political influence of the South in the national 
body politic, racist attitudes and even legally discriminatory policies 
permeated well beyond the South. 96 This permeation should not be 
surprising given that the United States was still one country and cul-
tural and racial attitudes could not be neatly confined to discrete re-
gions. Not until the 1948 decision in Shelley v. Kraemer were re-
strictive covenants prohibiting the sale of homes to blacks forbid-
den.97 Northerners were also keenly aware of the large African-
American population in close geographical proximity, contributing 
to racial fears of Northern whites. One striking example of this is 
                                                                                                             
 91 See, e.g., ROY BECK, THE CASE AGAINST IMMIGRATION 35–42 (1996) (ar-
guing against immigration by looking at historical hostility to immigrants). 
 92 See, e.g., DeNeen L. Brown, When Portland Banned Blacks: Oregon’s 




 93 Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 with id. amend. XIV; see also 
Johnson, supra note 22. 
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Oregon’s constitution, which originally forbade any black Ameri-
cans from even residing in the state.98 The stranglehold that primar-
ily Southern racial attitudes had on the country as a whole is clearly 
shown in the federal policies of the period after the Civil War—the 
federal government actively participated in social and economic 
subordination of African Americans through the organization of fed-
eral programs and employment policies.99 
One example of broad American Exceptionalism in a religious 
context is the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (“LDS”), 
the adherents of which are sometimes incorrectly referred to as Mor-
mons.100 LDS has historically evidenced a strong racist theology.101 
LDS theologians have based this theology on the presumed inferi-
ority of African Americans.102 In his Journal of Discourses, 
Brigham Young explained the Mormon theology with respect to 
black Africans: 
Shall I tell you the law of God in regard to the Afri-
can Race? If the white man who belongs to the cho-
sen seed mixes his blood with the seed of Cain, the 
penalty, under the law of God, is death on the spot. 
This will always be so.103 
. . . . 
You see some classes of the human family that are 
black, uncouth, uncomely, disagreeable and low in 
their habits, wild, and seemingly deprived of nearly 
                                                                                                             
 98 OR. CONST. art. I, § 3 (repealed 1926); see also DeNeen, supra note 92. 
 99 See generally FEAGIN, supra note 96, at 179–85 (discussing government 
social and economic programs and their effect on African Americans). 
 100 See Amanda Casanova, Mormons - 10 Things to Know About the Church 
of Latter Day Saints, CHRISTIANITY.COM (May 21, 2018), https://www.christian-
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 103 7 BRIGHAM YOUNG, ET AL., JOURNAL OF DISCOURSES 290 (1854), 
https://contentdm.lib.byu.edu/digital/collection/JournalOfDiscourses3/id/2854. 
130 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:109 
 
all the blessings of the intelligence that is generally 
bestowed upon mankind. The first man that commit-
ted the odious crime of killing one of his brethren 
will be cursed the longest of any one of the children 
of Adam. Cain slew his brother. Cain might have 
been killed, and that would have put a termination to 
that line of human beings. This was not to be, and the 
Lord put a mark upon him, which is the flat nose and 
black skin. Trace mankind down to after the flood, 
and then another curse is pronounced upon the same 
race—that they should be the “servant of servants;” 
and they will be, until that curse is removed.104 
In 1978, the LDS Church announced that God had removed the 
“curse of Cain” upon African Americans when God allegedly made 
a divine revelation to church head Spencer Kimball that blacks could 
become priests.105 
The racism embedded in both the Southern strain of the Baptist 
faith106 and the LDS Church,107 both religions indigenous to the 
United States,108 provides a broader context for understanding both 
the Southern and American forms of legal exceptionalism with re-
spect to race. 
III.  A COMPARATIVE VIEW: THE DEBATE OVER  
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 
As discussed previously, Southern Exceptionalism has been part 
of the larger debate over American Exceptionalism. Often, it is 
Southern Exceptionalism that has an outsized role in relegating the 
United States to the dubious position of being an international out-
cast in relation to many of its international peers with respect to sev-
                                                                                                             
 104 10 BRIGHAM YOUNG, ET AL., JOURNAL OF DISCOURSES 110 (1854), 
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discriminatory views against gay people and comparing them to the Christian fun-
damentalists’ discriminatory views against racial minorities during colonial 
times). 
 106 Hassan, supra note 64. 
 107 Mormon Racism in Perspective, supra note 101. 
 108 Casanova, supra note 100; Hassan, supra note 64; 
2019] JUSTICE SCALIA GOT IT RIGHT, BUT FOR THE WRONG REASONS 131 
 
eral contemporary social issues. On numerous occasions, the South-
ern states have held positions that are inconsistent with international 
norms. For example, in the years since the civil rights era, these 
states have persisted in limiting national progress on issues relating 
to juvenile executions, gender equality, LGBTQ+ rights, and voting 
rights. On all of these matters, the United States was until recently—
or in some cases still remains—an international outlier. 
A. Juvenile Executions 
Nowhere has the United States been more exceptional in com-
parison to the rest of the “civilized” world than in the area of juve-
nile executions. At the time of the 2005 Supreme Court decision in 
Roper v. Simmons, which found juvenile executions violative of the 
Eighth Amendment,109 the United States was among the very few 
countries in the world that still legally executed juveniles.110 This 
timeframe is truly extraordinary when one considers the horrendous 
human rights record of some countries that banned the practice be-
fore the United States.111 
The Roper case illustrates the tension between Justices Kennedy 
and Scalia. Justice Kennedy did not hesitate to use comparative law 
and international norms as factors in deciding cases,112 while Justice 
Scalia vehemently argued against using international or comparative 
law to demonstrate a consensus on a topic.113 However, Justice 
Scalia’s disdain for using international or comparative law in almost 
any capacity in American courts was evident years before the Roper 
decision.114 This disdain seems to be correlated with his reaction to 
                                                                                                             
 109 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
 110 See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 29, at 1. 
 111 Prior to Roper, countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia had, at least pub-
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the Southern Exception.115 While the South was out of step with the 
rest of the country, it was even more misaligned with the rest of the 
democratic, industrialized world.116 After all, the South comprised 
a substantial portion of the United States population, but it com-
prised a much smaller portion of the industrialized world. If Justice 
Scalia and several other conservative Justices deeply resented the 
non-Southern portion of the United States imposing its views on the 
Southern states, they were even more resentful of the rest of the 
world doing the same. As started above, this Article does not purport 
to speculate as to the deeper reasons for these Justices’ position vis-
à-vis states’ rights, but only to illustrate the patterns these reasons 
present. 
For example, Justice Scalia took umbrage with Justice Stevens’s 
opinion in Thompson v. Oklahoma, which held juvenile executions 
unconstitutional where the person in question was fifteen years old 
at the time of committing a capital offense.117 While Stevens cited 
international and comparative law in support of the Court’s defini-
tion of the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of 
a maturing society,”118 Scalia vigorously dissented, writing against 
the use of comparative or international law as legitimate factors in 
determining whether a “consensus” existed on the issue.119 Years 
later, Justice Scalia’s objection to this procedure was even greater in 
Roper v. Simmons where he said, “[a]cknowledgment of foreign ap-
proval has no place in the legal opinion of this Court unless it is part 
of the basis for the Court’s judgment—which is surely what it pa-
rades as today.”120 
B.  Gender Equality 
The United States has found itself as an international outsider in 
yet another subject area—gender equality. Amongst its international 
peers, the United States ranked fifty-first in the World Economic 
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Forum’s 2018 Global Gender Gap report.121 Further, the United 
States had a score of 0.72 out of 1.00, with 1.00 equaling complete 
parity between the sexes.122 Between having the highest rate of ma-
ternal deaths compared to any other country in the developed 
world123 or a lackluster number of women in high government posi-
tions,124 inter alia, the United States ranks behind almost all other 
industrialized nations. 
As in the case of juvenile executions, the Southern states ac-
counted for much of this American Exceptionalism. When one looks 
closer at the statistics, there remains a chasm within the United 
States between the Southern states and the rest of the nation.125 Al-
though this proposition and the following discussion are sociologi-
cal observations, and not strictly legal conclusions, they illustrate 
the connections between these sets of social, “hot-button” issues and 
the regional variation with respect to race. There is not an obvious 
reason why racism should be correlated with sexism, homophobia, 
executions of juveniles, or other traditionally conservative positions 
on social issues, but the correlation has been consistent with the le-
gal positions of Justice Scalia and similarly-minded Justices. Why 
this correlation should exist is, once again, beyond the scope of this 
Article, and the answer most likely lies in the realm of psychology 
and sociology. 
As an example of this correlation, a study comparing women 
throughout the country graded each state based on findings across 
six categories: political participation, employment and earnings, 
work and family, poverty and opportunity, health and wellbeing, and 
reproductive rights.126 Overall, no Southern state received a grade 
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above a C-, and the majority of the Southern states received some 
version of a D grade.127 Some of the worst discrepancies involved 
pay. It is estimated that in 2014, working women in the South earned 
on average $6,392 less due to wage inequality among the sexes.128 
Collectively, working women in the South lose an estimated $155.4 
billion per year due to wage discrepancy between men and 
women.129 
Besides the differences in pay gaps, the lack of paid family leave 
across the Southern states is another factor that makes the United 
States, as a whole, perform less favorably with respect to gender 
than its international counterparts. In the United States, not one 
Southern state requires paid leave to its employees130 whereas sev-
eral non-Southern states do.131 Furthermore, when compared to 
forty-one other nations in a survey conducted by the Organization 
for Economic Development (“OECD”), the United States was the 
only country to not provide new parents with universal paid family 
leave.132 This policy also has a disproportionate racial effect because 
four out of five black Southern mothers are the main breadwinners 
in their family.133 One could speculate that the disproportionate ra-
cial effect is not irrelevant. Arguably, Southern state legislatures 
may have more readily accepted policies involving grossly disparate 
impacts by gender because the effects of those policies were most 
heavily experienced by the black population, which has, for most of 
this country’s history, been politically irrelevant. 
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C. LGBTQ+ Rights 
An issue that further illustrates the Southern Exception and the 
influence of the South on national policy in the United States at large 
has been the fight for decriminalization and equality for members of 
the LGBTQ+ community. Although the United States currently en-
joys marriage equality,134 the United States was otherwise very late 
to embrace civil rights for the LGBTQ+ community.135 Until the 
Lawrence v. Texas136 decision in 2003, the United States was the 
only industrialized nation criminalizing same-gender sexual rela-
tions.137 In Lawrence, as in Roper,138 Justice Kennedy used interna-
tional and comparative law139 to justify eliminating sodomy laws 
and to reject the reasoning of Bowers v. Hardwick,140 the previous 
case which refused to find sodomy laws unconstitutional.141 Justice 
Kennedy wrote that: 
Where a case’s foundations have sustained serious 
erosion, criticism from other sources is of greater sig-
nificance. . . . [T]o the extent Bowers relied on val-
ues shared with a wider civilization, the case’s rea-
soning and holding have been rejected by the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, and that other nations 
have taken action consistent with an affirmation of 
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the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in 
intimate, consensual conduct.142 
In doing so, he earned a bitter rebuke from Justice Scalia, who again 
argued that there was no consensus within the United States for find-
ing sodomy laws unconstitutional.143 
In 2015, following a rapid increase in public approval of homo-
sexuality, the United States Supreme Court declared the right to 
marriage a fundamental right guaranteed to all citizens through the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Oberge-
fell v. Hodges.144 While the United States undoubtedly deserves 
credit for legalizing gay marriage, it was by no means the first coun-
try to legalize same-sex marriage.145 In 2015, at the time of the 
Obergefell decision, twenty-one other nations had already preserved 
this right.146 From the American perspective, it is interesting to look 
how different the pace of reform occurred throughout the states. As 
early as 2003, around the same time the first countries began legal-
izing gay marriage, Massachusetts became the first state to allow 
gay marriage through the Massachusetts Supreme Court decision 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.147 In fact, Massachu-
setts Chief Justice Margaret Marshall has noted the similarities in 
the attitudes towards race in her home country of South Africa and 
the attitudes towards same-sex marriage of many Americans.148 In 
this sense, the Massachusetts opinion’s acknowledgement of chang-
ing attitudes towards same-sex marriage mirrored the Supreme 
Court jurisprudence’s treatment of Southern Exceptionalism and the 
attitudes of non-Southern states as discussed supra. 
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In 2008, Connecticut followed suit,149 with Iowa150 and Ver-
mont151 joining the ranks in 2009 and New Hampshire152 in 2010. 
During this period and the years that followed, many other non-
Southern states, European countries, and Western Hemisphere 
countries legalized same-sex marriage as well.153 
However, as recently as 2013, before Obergefell forced gay mar-
riage on the Southern states,154 not only did every Southern state 
restrict gay marriage—except for West Virginia—they placed an 
outright state constitutional ban on the practice.155 By 2014, thirty-
five states had legalized gay marriage with the South being the pre-
dominant region in opposition.156 
Even though gay marriage enjoys the support of a majority of 
Americans, it does not enjoy the same level of support in the 
South.157 As was the case with previous opposition to racial equal-
ity, Southern Christians, especially Southern Baptists, were particu-
larly opposed to marriage equality.158  If not for the Supreme Court 
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taking action, thereby enshrining marriage equality as a fundamental 
right, it is unlikely that gay marriage would have been legalized an-
ytime soon in the Southern states.159 
D. Voting Rights 
The issue of voting rights is central to the discussion of how a 
Southern Exception has impacted American jurisprudence. The en-
actment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965160 was a milestone in 
achieving legal and political equality of all Americans.161 This leg-
islation finally provided protection to African Americans in the 
South who had been kept from voting through numerous means in-
cluding intimidation, threats, physical violence, literacy tests, and 
poll taxes.162 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court overturned portions of the Vot-
ing Rights Act in the 2013 decision Shelby County v. Holder, open-
ing the door for states and local jurisdictions to create impediments 
for minority voting.163 This ruling invalidated Section 4(b) of the 
Voting Rights Act,164 eliminating the preclearance requirement for 
areas of the country that were deemed by Congress to have engaged 
in discriminatory practices with respect to voting.165 In a sense, Sec-
tion 4(b) was the legislative equivalent of the Southern Exception, 
as it subjected historically discriminatory regions of the country—
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often Southern states—to a preclearance requirement before chang-
ing their voting laws, while the remainder of the country was free 
from such a requirement.166 
At the core of the majority opinion in Shelby is a rebuke of the 
Voting Rights Act’s implied Southern Exception. Writing for the 
majority, Chief Justice Roberts summarized his main justification 
for overturning parts of the Voting Rights Act, stating that “[t]here 
is no denying, however, that the conditions that originally justified 
these measures no longer characterize voting in the covered juris-
dictions.”167 Nevertheless, as the dissent noted, one of the core rea-
sons voting patterns have changed for the better in the South is be-
cause of the continued enforcement of the Voting Rights Act it-
self.168 
The dissent’s perspective on the Southern states appears to be 
somewhat validated by events since Shelby. For example, as of 
2016, thirty-two states have voter-ID laws designed to make voting 
more difficult.169 In 2014, just one year after the Shelby decision, 
North Carolina passed the worst voter suppression law in the coun-
try, shortening access to early voting by a week, passing stringent 
new voter-ID laws, eliminating same-day registration and pre-regis-
tration for sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds, and ending out-of-pre-
cinct voting for statewide races.170 All of these measures had the 
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effect of decreasing minority voter turnout and eliminating many of 
the strides made when Section 4(b) was in effect.171 For example, 
nearly 70% of all African Americans who voted in 2012 used early 
voting.172 
Yet, it was not just North Carolina that began to roll back voter 
protections shortly after the Shelby decision. Alabama,173 Texas,174 
Virginia,175 and Mississippi176 also immediately passed voter sup-
pression laws in the first year after Shelby. Notably, all of the afore-
mentioned states were previously covered under Section 4(b) of the 
Voting Rights Act,177 although some other Republican-controlled 
non-Southern states have passed similar measures.178 Generally 
speaking, states with a history of discriminating against African-
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American voting rights are the same states currently passing dis-
criminatory voter suppression laws.179 
In fairness, if Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia deserve criticism 
for being unwilling to consider issues within their given social con-
text, Justice Kennedy’s decision to side with the majority in this case 
seems very perplexing.180 Looking at Justice Kennedy’s prior views 
in favor of using international law as a legitimate factor to be con-
sidered in the United States legal system,181 it seems incongruous 
that Justice Kennedy did not consider the social conditions that orig-
inally necessitated the Voting Rights Act of 1965. While Justice 
Kennedy has been willing to consider local social conditions and 
comparative law in decisions concerning issues such as gender 
rights, LGBTQ+ rights, and juvenile executions, he has been more 
hesitant to determine that social issues such as voting rights and re-
districting—with a known history of racial bias—are worthy of al-
lowing for a Southern Exception.182 Perhaps Justice Kennedy 
simply exhibited the same blind spot with respect to race that gave 
rise to Southern and American Exceptionalism in the first place. 
CONCLUSION 
Justice Scalia’s recognition of a Southern Exception in Supreme 
Court jurisprudence reflects the understanding by some Supreme 
Court Justices of the truly extraordinary political, cultural, and legal 
history of the Southern United States, and by extension, of the 
United States itself. The deference of a significant block of Justices 
to the legal policies created by hundreds of years of racial oppres-
sion is reflected not only in these Justices’ defense of historical 
Southern Exceptionalism from the legal norms of most the United 
States, but also in their hostility to international and comparative law 
in general, and specifically those norms that contravene Southern 
Exceptionalism. 
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Particularly significant for the thesis of this Article is that one of 
the most prominent proponents of such an exception, at least in cer-
tain cases, was Justice Kennedy—a conservative Justice who could 
not be accused of pursuing any kind of partisan agenda. Rather, he 
recognized that the legal norms encompassed by Southern Excep-
tionalism were incompatible with the evolving norms of industrial-
ized societies. 
 
